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Frequency-driven market mechanisms for optimal
dispatch in power networks
Tjerk Stegink, Ashish Cherukuri, Claudio De Persis, Arjan van der Schaft, and Jorge Corte´s
Abstract—This paper studies real-time bidding mechanisms for
economic dispatch and frequency regulation in electrical power
networks. We consider a market administered by an independent
system operator (ISO) where a group of strategic generators
participate in a Bertrand game of competition. Generators bid
prices at which they are willing to produce electricity. Each
generator aims to maximize their profit, while the ISO seeks to
minimize the total generation cost and to regulate the frequency
of the system. We consider a continuous-time bidding process
coupled with the swing dynamics of the network through the use
of frequency as a feedback signal for the negotiation process.
We analyze the stability of the resulting interconnected system,
establishing frequency regulation and the convergence to a Nash
equilibrium and optimal generation levels. The results are verified
in the IEEE 14-bus benchmark case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power generation dispatch is typically done in a hierarchical
fashion, where the different layers are separated according
to their time scales. Broadly, at the top layer economic
efficiency is ensured via market clearing and at the bottom
layer frequency control and regulation is achieved via pri-
mary and secondary controllers. However, the intermittent
and uncertain nature of distributed energy resources (DERs)
and their integration into the power grid represents a major
challenge to the current design. Of particular concern is the
need to maintain both frequency regulation and cost efficiency
of regulation reserves in the face of increasing fluctuations in
renewables. To this end, we propose an integrated dynamic
market mechanism which combines the real-time market and
frequency regulation, allowing competitive market players,
including renewable generation, to negotiate electricity prices
while using the most recent information on the grid frequency.
Literature review: The combination of economic dispatch
and frequency regulation has received increasing attention in
recent years. Various works have sought to move beyond the
traditional and compartmentalized hierarchical control layers
to instead simultaneously achieve frequency stabilization and
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economic dispatch in power networks [2], [3], [4] and micro-
grids [5], [6]. Along this line of research, the various agents
involved work cooperatively towards the satisfaction of a
common goal. An alternative body of research has investigated
the use of price-based incentives for economic generation- and
demand-side management and frequency regulation [7], [8],
[9]. To achieve these goals, these works consider dynamic
pricing mechanisms in conjunction with system dynamics of
the power network. We also adopt this approach, with the
important distinction that here we allow generators to bid in
the market (hence, they are price-setters rather than price-
takers). This viewpoint results in a Bertrand game of com-
petition among the generators. Our previous work [10], [11]
studied this type of games established that iterative bidding
can achieve convergence to an optimal allocation of power
generation, without considering the effects on the dynamics
of the power network. The underlying assumption was that
generation setpoints could be commanded after convergence,
which in practice poses a limitation, considering the fast time-
scales at which DERs operate. Instead, this paper proposes an
online bidding scheme where the setpoints are updated contin-
uously throughout time to better cope with fast changes in the
network. In this way, we tackle simultaneously both frequency
regulation, optimal power dispatch and the competitive aspect
among the generators.
Statement of contributions: We consider an electrical power
network consisting of an independent system operator (ISO)
and a group of competitive generators. Each generator seeks to
maximize its individual profit, while the ISO aims to solve the
economic dispatch problem and regulate the frequency. Since
the generators are not willing to share their cost functions,
the ISO is unable to solve the economic dispatch problem.
Instead, it has the generators compete in a bidding market
where they submit bids to the ISO in the form of a price at
which they are willing to produce electricity. In return, the ISO
determines the power generations levels the generators have
to meet. We analyze the underlying Bertrand game among the
generators and characterize the Nash equilibria that correspond
to optimal power dispatch termed efficient Nash equilibria. In
particular, we establish the existence of such efficient Nash
equilibria and provide a sufficient condition for its uniqueness.
We also propose a Nash equilibrium seeking scheme in the
form of a continuous-time bidding process that captures the
interaction between the generators and the ISO. In this scheme,
the generators adjust their bid based on their current bid
and the production level that the ISO requests from them
with the aim to maximize their profit. At the same time, the
ISO adjusts the generation setpoints to minimize the total
2payment to the generators while taking the power balance
and frequency deviation into account. Moreover, along the
execution of the algorithm the nonnegativity constraints on the
bids and power generation quantities are satisfied. The use of
the local frequency error as a feedback signal in the negotiation
process couples the ISO-generator coordination scheme with
the swing dynamics of the power network. We show that
each equilibrium of the interconnected system corresponds
to an efficient Nash equilibrium, optimal generation levels
and zero frequency regulation. We furthermore establish local
convergence to such an equilibrium by invoking a suitable
invariance principle for the closed-loop projected dynamical
system. Finally, the numerical results on the IEEE 14-bus
benchmark show fast convergence of the closed-loop system
to an optimal equilibrium, even under sudden changes of the
load and the cost functions.
Notation: Let R,R≥0,R>0 be the set of real, nonnegative
real, and positive real numbers, respectively. We write the set
{1, . . . , n} compactly as [n]. We denote by 1 ∈ Rn the vector
whose elements are equal to 1. Given a twice differentiable
function f : Rn → R, its gradient and its Hessian evaluated
at x is written as ∇f(x) and ∇2f(x), respectively. A twice
continuously differentiable function f : Rn → R is strongly
convex on S ⊂ Rn if it is convex and, for some µ > 0, its
Hessian satisfies ∇2f(x) > µI for all x ∈ S. For scalars
a, b ∈ R we denote by [a]+b the operator
[a]+b =
{
a if b > 0
max(a, 0) if b = 0.
(1)
For vectors a, b ∈ Rn, [a]+b denotes the vector whose i-th ele-
ment is given by [ai]
+
bi
for i ∈ [n]. For A ∈ Rm×n, the induced
2-norm is denoted by ‖A‖. Given v ∈ Rn, τ ∈ Rn×n, we write
‖v‖τ :=
√
vT τv. Given a set of numbers v1, v2, . . . , vn ∈ R,
col(v1, . . . , vn) denotes the column vector
[
v1, . . . , vn
]T
and
likewise diag(v1, . . . , vn) denotes the n × n diagonal matrix
with entries v1, . . . , vn on the diagonal. For u, v ∈ Rn we
write u ⊥ v if uT v = 0. We use the compact notational form
0 ≤ u ⊥ v ≥ 0 to denote the complementarity conditions
u ≥ 0, v ≥ 0, u ⊥ v. The notations sin(.) and cos(.) are
used to represent the element-wise sine and cosine functions
respectively.
II. POWER NETWORK MODEL AND DYNAMICS
We consider an electrical power network consisting of n
buses and m transmission lines. The network is represented
by a connected and undirected graph G = (V , E), where
nodes V = [n] represent buses and edges E ⊂ V × V are
the transmission lines connecting the buses. The edges are
arbitrarily labeled with a unique identifier in [m] and the
ends of each edge are arbitrary labeled with ‘+’ and ‘-’. The
incidence matrix D ∈ Rn×m of the resulting directed graph is
Dik =


+1 if i is the positive end of edge k,
−1 if i is the negative end of edge k,
0 otherwise.
Each bus i represents a control area and is assumed to have
one generator and a load Pdi. The dynamics at the buses is
assumed to be governed by the swing equations [12], given
by
δ˙ = ω
Mω˙ = −DΓ sin(DT δ)−Aω + Pg − Pd
(2)
with Pd = col(Pd1, . . . , Pdn). Here Γ = diag(γ1, . . . , γm),
where γk = BijViVj = BjiViVj and k ∈ [m] corresponds
to the edge between nodes i and j. Table I presents a list of
symbols employed in the model (2).
δ ∈ Rn voltage phase angle
ω ∈ Rn frequency deviation w.r.t. the nominal frequency
Pg ∈ R
n
≥0 power generation
Pd ∈ R
n
≥0 power load
M ∈ Rn×n
≥0
diagonal matrix of moments of inertia
A ∈ Rn×n
≥0
diagonal matrix of asynchronous damping constants
Vi ∈ R>0 voltage magnitude at bus i
Bij ∈ R>0 negative of the susceptance of transmission line (i, j)
Table I: State variables and parameters of swing equations (2).
For the stability analysis carried out later, it is conve-
nient to work with the voltage phase angle differences ϕ =
DTt δ ∈ Rn−1. Here Dt ∈ Rn×(n−1) is the incidence matrix
of an arbitrary tree graph on the set of buses [n] (e.g.,
a spanning tree of the physical network). Furthermore, let
U(ϕ) = −1TΓ cos(DTD†Tt ϕ), where D†t = (DTt Dt)−1DTt
denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of Dt. Then the
physical system (2) in the (ϕ, ω)-coordinates takes the form
ϕ˙ = DTt ω
Mω˙ = −Dt∇U(ϕ) −Aω + Pg − Pd,
(3)
where we observe that DtD
†
tD = (I − 1n11T )D = D.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this section we formulate the problem statement, intro-
duce the necessary game-theoretic tools and discuss the goals
of the paper.
A. ISO-generator coordination
Taking as starting point the electrical power network model
described in Section II, here we outline the elements of the
ISO-generator coordination problem following the exposition
of [10], [11]. Let Ci : R≥0 → R≥0 be the cost incurred
by generator i ∈ [n] in producing Pgi units of power. We
assume Ci is strongly convex on the domain R≥0 and satisfies
∇Ci(0) ≥ 0. Given the total network cost
C(Pg) :=
∑
i∈[n]
Ci(Pgi) (4)
and a power load Pd, the ISO seeks to solve the economic
dispatch (ED) problem
minimize C(Pg), (5a)
subject to 1TPg = 1
TPd, (5b)
Pg ≥ 0, (5c)
3and, at the same time, to regulate the frequency of the physical
power network. We assume the total load to be positive, i.e.,
1
TPd > 0 such that (5) is feasible. Since the constraints
(5b) (5c) are affine, Slater’s condition holds implying that
(5) has zero duality gap. We can also show that its primal-
dual optimizer (P ∗g , λ
∗, µ∗) is unique by exploiting strong
convexity of C. We assume that for the power injection
Pg = P
∗
g , there exists an equilibrium (ϕ¯, ω¯) of (3) that satisfies
DTD†Tt ϕ¯ ∈ (−pi/2, pi/2)m. The latter assumption is standard
and is referred to as the security constraint in the power
systems literature [12].
We note that the ISO cannot determine the optimizer of
the ED problem (5) because generators are strategic and they
do not reveal their cost functions to anyone. Instead, the ISO
operates a market where each generator i ∈ [n] submit a bid
bi ∈ R≥0 in the form of a price at which it is willing to
provide power. Based on these bids, the ISO aims to find the
power allocation that meets the load and minimizes the total
payment to the generators. Thus instead of solving the ED
problem (5) directly, the ISO considers, given a bid b ∈ Rn≥0,
the convex optimization problem
minimize bTPg, (6a)
subject to 1TPg = 1
TPd, (6b)
Pg ≥ 0. (6c)
A fundamental difference between (5) and (6) is that the
latter optimization is linear and may in general have multiple
solutions. Let P optg (b) be the optimizer of (6) the ISO selects
given bids b and note that this might not be unique. Knowing
the ISO’s strategy, each generator i bids a quantity bi ≥ 0 to
maximize its payoff
Πi(bi, P
opt
gi (b)) := P
opt
gi (b)bi − Ci(P optgi (b)), (7)
where P optgi (b) is the i-th component of the optimizer P
opt
g (b).
Note that this function is not continuous in the bid b. Since
each generator is strategic, we analyze the market clearing,
and hence the dispatch process explained above using tools
from game theory [13], [14].
B. Inelastic electricity market game
We define the inelastic electricity market game as
• Players: the set of generators [n].
• Action: for each player i, the bid bi ∈ R≥0.
• Payoff: for each player i, the payoff Πi defined in (7).
In the sequel we interchangeably use the notation b ∈ Rn≥0
and (bi, b−i) ∈ Rn≥0 for the bid vector, where b−i ∈ Rn−1≥0
represents the bids of all players except i. We note that
the payoff of generator i not only depends on the bids of
the other players but also on the optimizer P
opt
g (b) the ISO
selects. Therefore, the concept of a Nash equilibrium is defined
slightly differently compared to the usual one.
Definition III.1 (Nash equilibrium [11]). A bid profile b∗ ∈
R
n
≥0 is a Nash equilibrium of the inelastic electricity market
game if there exists an optimizer P optg (b∗) of (6) such that for
each i ∈ [n],
Πi(bi, P
opt
gi (bi, b
∗
−i)) ≤ Πi(b∗i , P optgi (b∗))
for all bi ∈ R≥0 with bi 6= b∗i and all optimizers P optgi (bi, b∗−i)
of (6) given bids (bi, b
∗
−i).
We are particularly interested in bid profiles for which the
optimizer of (5) is also a solution to (6). This is captured in
the following definition.
Definition III.2 (Efficient bid and efficient Nash equilibrium).
An efficient bid of the inelastic electricity market is a bid b∗ ∈
R
n
≥0 for which the optimizer P
∗
g of (5) is also an optimizer
of (6) given bids b = b∗ and
P ∗gi = argmax
Pgi≥0
{Pgib∗i − Ci(Pgi)} for each i ∈ [n]. (8)
A bid b∗ ∈ Rn≥0 is an efficient Nash equilibrium of the inelastic
electricity market game if it is an efficient bid and a Nash
equilibrium.
At the efficient Nash equilibrium, the optimizer of the ED
problem coincides with the production levels that maximize
the individual profits (7) of the generators. This justifies
studying the efficient Nash equilibria.
C. Paper objectives
Given the problem setup described above, neither the ISO
nor the individual strategic generators are able to determine
the efficient Nash equilibrium a priori. As a first objective,
we are interested in designing a Nash equilibrium seeking
mechanism in the form of a bidding process where the
generators coordinate with the ISO to dynamically update their
bids and production levels, while respecting the nonnegativity
constraints throughout its execution. Our second objective is
the characterization of the stability properties of the intercon-
nection of the bidding process with the physical dynamics of
the power network.
IV. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section we establish existence of an efficient Nash
equilibrium and also provide a condition for its uniqueness.
While [11] has established the existence of one specific
efficient Nash equilibrium, we provide in the following result
a characterization of all efficient Nash equilibria.
Proposition IV.1. (Characterization of efficient Nash equilib-
ria): Let (P ∗g , λ
∗, µ∗) be the unique primal-dual optimizer of
(5), that is, P ∗g ∈ Rn, λ∗ ∈ R, µ∗ ∈ Rn satisfy the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
∇C(P ∗g ) = 1λ∗ + µ∗, 1TP ∗g = 1TPd,
0 ≤ P ∗g ⊥ µ∗ ≥ 0.
(9)
Suppose P ∗gi > 0 for at least two distinct generators. Then,
any b∗ ∈ Rn≥0 satisfying 1λ∗ ≤ b∗ ≤ ∇C(P ∗g ) is an efficient
Nash equilibrium of the inelastic electricity market game.
Proof. Let (P ∗g , λ
∗, µ∗) satisfy (9), then in particular 1λ∗ ≤
∇C(P ∗g ). Fix any bid b∗ ∈ Rn≥0 satisfying 1λ∗ ≤ b∗ ≤
∇C(P ∗g ). We will now prove that b∗ is efficient. Define
ν∗ := b∗ − 1λ∗ and note that (P ∗g , λ∗, ν∗) satisfies
b∗ = 1λ∗ + ν∗, 1TP ∗g = 1
TPd
0 ≤ P ∗g ⊥ ν∗ ≥ 0.
(10)
4We note that Slater’s condition holds for (6) and its KKT
conditions are given by (10). Consequently, P ∗g is a primal
optimizer of (6). In addition, the bid b∗ satisfies
P ∗gi = argmax
Pgi≥0
{Pgib∗i − Ci(Pgi)} for each i ∈ [n]. (11)
This is true as for each i ∈ [n], the following optimality
conditions
∇Ci(P ∗gi) = b∗i + η∗i , 0 ≤ P ∗gi ⊥ η∗i ≥ 0,
are satisfied for η∗i = ∇Ci(P ∗gi)− b∗i . Note that in the above
set of conditions, P ∗giη
∗
i = 0 because if P
∗
gi > 0, then
∇Ci(P ∗gi) = λ∗ = b∗i . Thus, we have established that b∗
is efficient. In the remainder of the proof we show that b∗
is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose generator i deviates from the
bid b∗i . We distinguish between two cases. Suppose first that
bi > b
∗
i , then by replacing b
∗ by (bi, b
∗
−i) in (6) and checking
the optimality conditions, we obtain P optgi (bi, b
∗
−i) = 0 as,
by assumption, there is at least one other generator j such
that b∗j = λ
∗ < bi. Without loss of generality assume that
P ∗gi > 0 since otherwise Πi(b
∗
i , P
∗
gi) = Πi(bi, P
opt
gi (bi, b
∗
−i)).
For P ∗gi > 0, we have b
∗
i = ∇Ci(P ∗gi) and therefore
∇Ci(Pgi) ≤ b∗i for all Pgi ∈ [0, P ∗gi]. As a result
Πi(bi, P
opt
gi (bi, b
∗
−i)) = C(0) ≤ Πi(b∗i , P ∗gi)
This shows that a bid bi > b
∗
i does not increase its payoff.
Suppose now that bi < b
∗
i , then
Πi(bi, P
opt
gi (bi, b
∗
−i)) = biP
opt
gi (bi, b
∗
−i))− Ci(P optgi (bi, b∗−i))
≤ b∗iP optgi (bi, b∗−i))− Ci(P optgi (bi, b∗−i))
≤ b∗iP ∗gi − Ci(P ∗gi) = Πi(b∗i , P ∗gi)
where the second inequality follows from (11) as b∗ is ef-
ficient. Hence, each generator i has no incentive to deviate
from bid b∗i given b
∗
−i. We conclude that b
∗ is an efficient
Nash equilibrium of the inelastic electricity market game.
The proof of Proposition IV.1 shows that if P ∗gi > 0, then
generator i’s efficient Nash equilibrium bid b∗i is equal to
the (unique) Lagrange multiplier λ∗ associated to the power
balance (5b). In the other case that P ∗gi = 0, generator i’s Nash
equilibrium bid is larger than or equal to λ∗. This represents
the case that generator i’s marginal costs at zero power
production is larger than or equal to the market clearing price,
and hence generator i is not willing to produce any electricity
in that case. The underlying assumption in Proposition IV.1 is
that at least two generators have a positive production at the
optimal generation levels. We assume this condition holds for
the remainder of the paper unless stated otherwise.
The previous observations lead to the identification of the
same sufficient condition as in [11] to guarantee the unique-
ness of the efficient Nash equilibrium, which we state here for
completeness.
Corollary IV.2 (Uniqueness of the efficient Nash equilib-
rium [11]). Let (P ∗g , λ
∗, µ∗) be the primal-dual optimizer
of (5) and suppose that P ∗g > 0, then b
∗ = ∇C(P ∗g ) = 1λ∗ is
the unique efficient Nash equilibrium of the inelastic electricity
market game.
Remark IV.3 (Any efficient Nash equilibrium is positive). We
observe from the optimality conditions (9) that, since 1TPd >
0, and P ∗g ≥ 0, we must have that P ∗gi > 0 and µ∗i = 0 for
some i ∈ [n]. As ∇Ci(P ∗gi) > 0 by the strict convexity of Ci
and the assumption ∇Ci(0) ≥ 0, this implies that λ∗ > 0 and
therefore also b∗ > 0. •
V. INTERCONNECTION OF BID UPDATE SCHEME WITH
POWER NETWORK DYNAMICS
In this section we introduce a Nash equilibrium seeking
mechanism between the generators and the ISO. Each genera-
tor dynamically updates its bid based on the power generation
setpoint received from the ISO, while the ISO changes the
power generation setpoints depending on the generator bids
and the frequency of the network. This update mechanism
of the bids and the setpoints is written as a continuous-time
dynamical system. We assume that each generator can only
communicate with the ISO and is not aware of the number of
other generators participating, their respective cost functions,
or the load at its own bus. We study the interconnection of the
online bidding process with the power system dynamics and
establish local convergence to an efficient Nash equilibrium,
optimal power dispatch, and zero frequency deviation.
A. Price-bidding mechanism
In our design, each generator i ∈ [n] changes its bid bi ≥ 0
according to the projected dynamical system
τbib˙i = [Pgi −∇C∗i (bi)]+bi , (12a)
with gain τbi > 0. The projection operator in the above
dynamics ensures that trajectories starting in the nonnegative
orthant remain there. The map C∗i : R≥0 → R≥0 denotes the
convex conjugate of the cost function Ci and is defined as
C∗i (bi) := max
Pgi≥0
{biPgi − Ci(Pgi)}.
Using tools from convex analysis [15, Section I.6], one can
deduce that C∗i is convex and continuously differentiable
on the domain R≥0 and strictly convex on the domain
[∇Ci(0),∞). Moreover, its gradient satisfies ∇C∗i (bi) =
argmaxPgi≥0{biPgi − Ci(Pgi)} for all bi ≥ 0.
The motivation behind the update law (12a) is as follows.
Given the bid bi > 0, generator i seeks to produce power that
maximizes its profit, which is given by
P desgi = ∇C∗i (bi) = argmax
Pgi≥0
{biPgi − Ci(Pgi)}.
However, if the ISO requests more power from the generator
compared to its desired quantity, i.e., Pgi > P
des
gi , then i will
increase its bid to increase its profit. On the other hand if
Pgi < P
des
gi , then i will decrease its bid.
For the ISO we also provide an update law which depends
on the generator bids and the network frequency. This involves
seeking a primal-dual optimizer of (6) or, equivalently, finding
a saddle-point of the augmented Lagrangian
L(Pg , λ) = bTPg + λ1T (Pd − Pg) + ρ‖1T (Pd − Pg)‖2,
5with parameter ρ > 0. By writing the associated projected
saddle-point dynamics (see e.g., [16], [17]), the ISO dynamics
takes the form
τgP˙g = [1λ− b+ ρ11T (Pd − Pg)− σ2ω]+Pg ,
τλλ˙ = 1
T (Pd − Pg),
(12b)
with design parameters σ, τλ ∈ R>0 and diagonal positive
definite matrix τg ∈ Rn×n. Bearing in mind the ISO’s second
objective of driving the frequency deviation to zero, we add
the feedback signal −σ2ω to adjust the generation based on
the frequency deviation in the grid.
The dynamics (12b) can be interpreted as follows. If gener-
ator i bids higher than the Lagrange multiplier λ (which can
be interpreted as a price) associated with the power balance
constraint (6b), then the power generation setpoint at node i
is decreased, and vice versa. The terms ρ11T (Pg − Pd) and
−σ2ω in (12b) help to compensate for the supply-demand
mismatch in the network.
In the following, we analyze the equilibria and the stability
of the interconnection of the physical power network dynam-
ics (3) with the bidding process (12). We assume that the
bids and power generations are initialized within the feasible
domain, i.e., b(0) ≥ 0, Pg(0) ≥ 0.
B. Equilibrium analysis of the interconnected system
The closed-loop system composed of the ISO-generator
bidding scheme (12) and the power network dynamics (3) is
described by
ϕ˙ = DTt ω (13a)
Mω˙ = −Dt∇U(ϕ)−Aω + Pg − Pd (13b)
τbb˙ = [Pg −∇C∗(b)]+b (13c)
τgP˙g = [1λ− b+ ρ11T (Pd − Pg)− σ2ω]+Pg (13d)
τλλ˙ = 1
T (Pd − Pg) (13e)
where C∗(b) :=
∑
i∈[n] C
∗
i (bi), τb = diag(τb1, . . . , τbn) ∈
R
n×n. We investigate the equilibria of (13). In particular,
we are interested in equilibria that correspond simultaneously
to an efficient Nash equilibrium, economic dispatch and fre-
quency regulation, as specified next.
Definition V.1 (Efficient equilibrium). An equilibrium x¯ =
col(ϕ¯, ω¯, b¯, P¯g, λ¯) of (13) is efficient if ω¯ = 0, b¯ is an efficient
Nash equilibrium, and P¯g is a primal optimizer of (5).
The next result shows that all equilibria of (13) are efficient.
Proposition V.2. (Equilibria are efficient): Any equilibrium
x¯ = col(ϕ¯, ω¯, b¯, P¯g, λ¯) of (13) is efficient.
Proof. Let x¯ be an equilibrium of (13), then there exist
µ¯b, µ¯g ∈ Rn such that
0 = DTt ω¯ (14a)
0 = −Dt∇U(ϕ¯)−Aω¯ + P¯g − Pd (14b)
0 = P¯g −∇C∗(b¯) + µ¯b (14c)
0 = 1λ¯− b¯+ µ¯g (14d)
0 = 1T (Pd − P¯g) (14e)
0 ≤ b¯ ⊥ µ¯b ≥ 0 (14f)
0 ≤ P¯g ⊥ µ¯g ≥ 0 (14g)
We first show that ω¯ = 0. From (14a) it follows that ω¯ = 1ωs
for some ωs ∈ R. Then by pre-multiplying (14b) by 1T and
using (14e) we obtain 1TA1ωs = 0, which implies that ω¯ =
1ωs = 0. We prove next that P¯g is a primal optimizer of (5).
We claim that µ¯b = 0 since, by contraction, if µ¯bi > 0 for
some i ∈ [n], then b¯i = 0 and therefore 0 = P¯gi−∇C∗i (b¯i)+
µ¯bi = P¯gi + µ¯bi > 0, see also Remark IV.3. Therefore, (14c)
implies that P¯g = ∇C∗(b¯) = argmaxPg≥0{PTg b¯ − C(Pg)}
and thus satisfies the optimality conditions
∇C(P¯g) = b¯+ η¯, 0 ≤ P¯g ⊥ η¯ ≥ 0, (15)
for some η¯. Let us define µ¯ = b¯ + η¯ − 1λ¯ ≥ 0 where the
inequality holds by (14d). By (14g) and (15) we have P¯Tg µ¯ =
P¯Tg (b¯− 1λ¯) = PTg µ¯g = 0. Hence, (P¯g, λ¯, µ¯) satisfies
∇C(P¯g) = 1λ¯+ µ¯, 1T P¯g = 1TPd,
0 ≤ P¯g ⊥ µ¯ ≥ 0,
(16)
implying that (P¯g, λ¯, µ¯) is a primal-dual optimizer of (5).
Furthermore, (15) implies b¯ ≤ ∇C(P¯g) and thus, by Propo-
sition IV.1, b¯ is an efficient Nash equilibrium. Hence, x¯ is an
efficient equilibrium of (13).
C. Convergence analysis
In this section we establish the local asymptotic convergence
of (13) to an efficient equilibrium.
Theorem V.3. Consider the subset of (efficient) equilibria,
X := {x¯ = col(ϕ¯, ω¯, b¯, P¯g, λ¯) : x¯ is an equilibrium of (13)
and DTD†Tt ϕ¯ ∈ (−pi/2, pi/2)m}.
Then X is locally asymptotically stable under (13). Moreover,
the convergence is to a point.
Proof. Our proof strategy to show local convergence to X is
based on applying Theorem A.1, which is a special case of the
invariance principle stated in [18] adapted for complementarity
systems. To this end, we rewrite the projected dynamical
system (13) as the equivalent complementarity system (17),
see also [19, Theorem 1] for more details,
ϕ˙ = DTt ω (17a)
Mω˙ = −Dt∇U(ϕ)−Aω + Pg − Pd (17b)
τbb˙ = Pg −∇C∗(b) + µb (17c)
τgP˙g = 1λ− b+ ρ11T (Pd − Pg)− σ2ω + µg (17d)
τλλ˙ = 1
T (Pd − Pg) (17e)
0 ≤ b ⊥ µb ≥ 0 (17f)
0 ≤ Pg ⊥ µg ≥ 0 (17g)
where µb, µg ∈ Rn. We can equivalently write (17) in the
compact form
x˙ = F (x) + CTΛ (18a)
0 ≤ Cx+ d ⊥ Λ ≥ 0 (18b)
6with x = col(ϕ, ω, b, Pg, λ),Λ = col(µb, µg), and
F (x) =


DTt ω
M−1(−Dt∇U(ϕ) −Aω + Pg − Pd)
τ−1b (Pg −∇C∗(b))
τ−1g (1λ− b+ ρ11T (Pd − Pg)− σ2ω)
τ−1λ 1
T (Pd − Pg)

 (19a)
C =
[
0 0 τ−1b 0 0 0
0 0 0 τ−1g 0 0
]
, d = 0. (19b)
Note that F is Lipschitz continuous1. For the equivalence of
the projected dynamical system (13) and the complementarity
system (17) to hold, we consider absolutely continuous solu-
tions t 7→ x(t) that satisfy (17) almost everywhere (in time)
in the sense of Lebesgue measure. In addition, we consider
(unique) solutions of (18) that are slow. That is, at each time
t, Λ satisfies (18b) and is such that x˙(t) is of minimal norm,
see also [19].
Let x¯ ∈ X be arbitrary and fixed for the remainder of the
proof. For aesthetic reasons we first consider the case where
σ = 1 in (13d) or (17d) and later we explain how to generalize
the convergence result. Consider the function V defined by
V (x) = U(ϕ)− (ϕ− ϕ¯)T∇U(ϕ¯)− U(ϕ¯) + 1
2
||x− x¯||2τ
(20)
with τ = blockdiag(0,M, τb, τg, τλ). Note that V (x¯) =
0,∇V (x¯) = 0 and, since DTD†Tt ϕ¯ ∈ (−pi/2, pi/2)m,
∇2V (x¯) > 0. Consequently, there exists a compact level set
Ψ of V around x¯. We show now that the two conditions of
Theorem A.1 are satisfied.
Condition (I): For C given in (19b) and d = 0 the
polyhedron (24) takes the form
K = {x = col(ϕ, ω, b, Pg, λ) : b ≥ 0, Pg ≥ 0}.
Consequently, for all x ∈ ∂K ∩Ψ we have
x−∇V (x) =


ϕ−∇U(ϕ) +∇U(ϕ¯)
ω −Mω
b− τb(b − b¯)
Pg − τg(Pg − P¯g)
λ− τλ(λ− λ¯)

 =


∗
∗
τbb¯
τgP¯g
∗

 ∈ K.
Condition (II): Since x¯ ∈ X there exists Λ¯ such that F (x¯)+
CT Λ¯ = 0. As a result, for each x ∈ K we have
〈∇V (x), F (x)〉 = 〈∇V (x), F (x) − F (x¯)− CT Λ¯〉
= (∇U(ϕ)−∇U(ϕ¯))DTω
+ ωT (−D(∇U(ϕ) −∇U(ϕ¯))−Aω + Pg − P¯g)
+ (b − b¯)T (Pg −∇C∗(b)− P¯g +∇C∗(b¯)− µ¯b)
+ (Pg − P¯g)T (1(λ− λ¯)− b+ b¯+ ρ11T (P¯g − Pg)
− σ2ω − µ¯g) + (λ− λ¯)1T (P¯g − Pg)
= −ωTAω − (b− b¯)T (∇C∗(b)−∇C∗(b¯))
− ρ‖1T (P¯g − Pg)‖2 − (b− b¯)T µ¯b
− (Pg − P¯g)T µ¯g ≤ 0
(21)
1Here we observe that, since C is continuously differentiable and µ-strongly
convex on R≥0, C
∗ is 1
µ
-Lipschitz continuous on R≥0.
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Figure 1: Schematic of the modified IEEE 14-bus benchmark.
Each edge in the graph represents a transmission line. Red
nodes represent loads. All the other nodes represent syn-
chronous generators, with different colors that match the ones
used in Figure 2. The physical dynamics are modeled by (2).
where the inequality holds because C∗ is convex, b¯T µ¯b =
0, P¯Tg µ¯g = 0 and µ¯b, µ¯g, b, Pg ≥ 0. Hence, the second
condition of Theorem A.1 is satisfied.
Invariance of Ψ: We note that (21) does not necessarily
imply that Ψ is forward invariant. We show this next. Observe
that for each x,Λ satisfying 0 ≤ Cx ⊥ Λ ≥ 0 we have
〈∇V (x), F (x) + CTΛ〉 = 〈∇V (x), F (x)〉
+ 〈∇V (x), CTΛ〉 ≤ 〈∇V (x), CTΛ〉
= (b − b¯)Tµb + (Pg − P¯g)Tµg
= −b¯Tµb − P¯Tg µg ≤ 0.
(22)
Hence, the V is non-increasing along trajectories initialized
in K ∩ Ψ. Since Ψ is a level set of V , this implies that Ψ is
forward invariant.
Largest invariant set: Define
E = {x ∈ K ∩Ψ : 〈F (x),∇V (x)〉 = 0}
and denote the largest invariant subset of E byM. By (21) we
note that each x ∈ M satisfies ω = 0,1T (Pd − Pg) = 0 and,
bi = b¯i > 0 (otherwise, if b¯i = 0, then 0 = P¯gi −∇C∗i (b¯i) +
µ¯bi = P¯gi + µ¯bi > 0, which results in a contradiction) for
each i ∈ [n] with P¯gi > 0 as C∗i is strictly convex around
such b¯i. For these i, Pgi = P¯gi > 0 by (13c) and bi = λ = λ¯
by (13d). For each x ∈M and i ∈ [n] with P¯gi = 0, we have
∇C∗i (bi) = ∇C∗i (b¯i) = 0 by the convexity of Ci and thus
Pgi = P¯gi = µbi = 0 and thus bi = λ+ µgi. Hence, M⊂ X
and therefore each trajectory initialized in Ψ converges to X .
Moreover, from (22), we deduce that x¯ is stable. Since this
equilibrium has been chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that every
point in X is Lyapunov stable, implying that convergence of
the trajectories is to a point.
The proof for the case σ > 0, σ 6= 1 proceeds in the same
way as before except that we appropriately scale the Lyapunov
function. Specifically, we define the Lyapunov function V as
in (20) but with τ = blockdiag(0,M, στb, στg, στλ) > 0.
VI. SIMULATIONS
We simulate the closed-loop dynamics (13) for the modified
IEEE 14-bus benchmark model illustrated in Figure 1. We
assume quadratic costs at each node i ∈ [14] of the form
Ci(Pgi) =
1
2
qiP
2
gi + ciPgi
7with qi > and ci ≥ 0. In the original 14-bus model, nodes
1, 2, 3, 6, 8 have synchronous generators while the other nodes
are load nodes and have no power generation. We replicate
this by increasing the cost (by setting qi, ci ≫ 0) at the load
nodes to ensure positive power generation is not profitable
at them. In addition, we choose Mi ∈ [4, 5.5] for generator
nodes i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 6, 8} and Mi ≪ 1 for the load nodes. We
set Ai ∈ [2, 3], Vi ∈ [1, 1.06] for all i ∈ [n] and ρ = 300. At
t = 0 s, the load (in MW’s) is given by
Pd = (0, 22, 80, 48, 7.6, 11, 0, 0, 30, 9.0, 3.5, 6.1, 14, 15).
Initially, we set (q1, q2, q3, q6, q8) = (26, 70, 150, 150, 300)
and (c1, c2, c3, c6, c8) = (7.5, 30, 90, 82.5, 75). The sys-
tem (13) is initialized at steady state at the optimal generation
level
(Pg1, Pg2) = (201, 44)
and with Pgi = 0 for all other nodes. Figure 2 shows the
evolution of the system in the case when σ = 300 and Figure
3 in the case when σ = 0. Note that in the latter case,
there is no frequency signal fed back into the bidding process,
so the dynamics (13) effectively becomes a cascaded system
(where the bidding process drives the physical dynamics of
the power network). At t = 1 s the load at node 3 is increased
from 80MW to 94.2MW and the trajectories converge to
a new efficient equilibrium with optimal power generation
level (Pg1, Pg2) = (211, 48) and Pgi = 0 for all other nodes.
Furthermore, at steady state generators 1, 2 bid equal to the
Lagrange multiplier while generators 3, 6, 8 bid their marginal
cost at zero production (bi = ci, for i = 3, 6, 8) and thus, by
Proposition IV.1, we know that this corresponds to an efficient
Nash equilibrium.
At t = 15 s the cost of producing electricity is decreased
in areas 3, 6, 8 by setting (q3, q6, q8) = (60, 75, 68) and
(c3, c6, c8) = (38, 45, 23). This allows these generators to
make profit by participating in the bidding process and results
in a reduction of the total cost of the generation from 9711 $/h
to 8540 $/h. As illustrated in both Figures 2 and 3, the power
generations converge to the new optimal steady state given by
(Pg1, Pg2, Pg3, Pg6, Pg8) = (161, 29, 21, 7, 41).
In addition, we observe that after each change of either the
load or the cost function, the frequency is stabilized and the
bids converge to a new efficient Nash equilibrium. The fact that
the frequency transients are better in Figure 2 than in Figure 3
is consistent, since in the latter case there is no frequency
feedback in the bidding process.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied a market-based power dispatch scheme and
its interconnection with the swing dynamic of the physical
network. From the market perspective, we have considered a
continuous-time bidding scheme that describes the negotiation
process between the independent system operator and a group
of competitive generators. Using the frequency as a feedback
signal in the bidding dynamics, we have shown that the
interconnected projected dynamical system provably converges
to an efficient Nash equilibrium (where generation levels
minimize the total cost) and to zero frequency deviation. In this
way, competitive generators are enabled to participate in the
real-time electricity market without compromising efficiency
and stability of the power system. Future work will investigate
finite-horizon scenarios and incorporate generator bounds and
power flow constraints in the economic dispatch formulation.
APPENDIX
Theorem A.1 (Invariance principle for complementarity sys-
tems [18]). Consider the system
x˙ = F (x) + CTΛ (23a)
0 ≤ Cx+ d ⊥ Λ ≥ 0 (23b)
with Lipschitz continuous F and let K be the polyhedron
K = {x : Cx + d ≥ 0}. (24)
Let Ψ ⊂ Rn be a compact set and V : Rn → R be a
continuous differentiable function such that
(I) x−∇V (x) ∈ K , for all x ∈ ∂K ∩Ψ,
(II) 〈∇V (x), F (x)〉 ≤ 0, for all x ∈ K ∩Ψ.
Let E ⊂ Rn be given by
E := {x ∈ K ∩Ψ : 〈F (x),∇V (x)〉 = 0}
and denote the largest invariant subset of E by M. Then, for
each x0 ∈ K such that its orbit satisfies γ(x0) ⊂ Ψ, we have
lim
t→∞
d(x(t; t0, x0),M) = 0.
REFERENCES
[1] T. Stegink, A. Cherukuri, C. D. Persis, A. van der Schaft, and J. Corte´s,
“Stable interconnection of continuous-time price-bidding mechanisms
with power network dynamics,” in Power Systems Computation Confer-
ence, Dublin, Ireland, 2018, submitted.
[2] S. Trip, M. Bu¨rger, and C. De Persis, “An internal model approach
to (optimal) frequency regulation in power grids with time-varying
voltages,” Automatica, vol. 64, pp. 240–253, 2016.
[3] X. Zhang and A. Papachristodoulou, “A real-time control framework for
smart power networks: Design methodology and stability,” Automatica,
vol. 58, pp. 43–50, 2015.
[4] N. Li, C. Zhao, and L. Chen, “Connecting automatic generation control
and economic dispatch from an optimization view,” IEEE Transactions
on Control of Network Systems, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 254–264, 2016.
[5] S. T. Cady, A. D. Domı´nguez-Garcı´a, and C. N. Hadjicostis, “A
distributed generation control architecture for islanded AC microgrids,”
IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, vol. 23, no. 5, pp.
1717–1735, 2015.
[6] F. Do¨rfler, J. W. Simpson-Porco, and F. Bullo, “Breaking the hierar-
chy: Distributed control and economic optimality in microgrids,” IEEE
Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 241–253,
2016.
[7] F. Alvarado, J. Meng, C. DeMarco, and W. Mota, “Stability analysis
of interconnected power systems coupled with market dynamics,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 695–701, 2001.
[8] D. J. Shiltz, M. Cvetkovic´, and A. M. Annaswamy, “An integrated
dynamic market mechanism for real-time markets and frequency reg-
ulation,” IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy, vol. 7, no. 2, pp.
875–885, 2016.
[9] T. Stegink, C. De Persis, and A. van der Schaft, “A unifying energy-
based approach to stability of power grids with market dynamics,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 2612–2622, 2017.
[10] A. Cherukuri and J. Corte´s, “Iterative bidding in electricity markets:
rationality and robustness,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.06505, 2017,
submitted to IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems.
8Time (s)
0 10 20 30
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Frequency deviation (Hz)
(a) Evolution of the frequency deviation.
After each change of the load or the cost
functions, the frequency is restored to its
nominal value.
Time (s)
0 10 20 30
0
50
100
150
200
250
Power generation (MW)
(b) Evolution of the power generation at
each node. After the change of the cost
functions in nodes 3, 6, 8, there is more
competition among the generators, result-
ing in lower power productions at node 1
and 2.
Time (s)
0 10 20 30
40
60
80
100
Bid ($/MWh)
(c) Evolution of the bids and the Lagrange
multiplier (represented by the dashed
black colored line). Initially, the marginal
costs (and the bids) at zero power produc-
tion are higher than the market equilibrium
price for nodes 3, 6, 8.
Figure 2: Simulations of the interconnection (13) between the ISO-generation bidding mechanism and the power network
dynamics with σ = 300. At t = 1 s the load at node 3 is increased from 80MW to 94.2MW. At t = 15 s the marginal
cost decreases at nodes 3, 6, 8 which allows these generators to make profit by lowering their bids to have a positive power
production as illustrated in plots (b) and (c).
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cause the bidding process does not take
into account its impact on the dynamics
of the power network.
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